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14 FEB 1961

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Memorandum No. 3458-S

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Guided Missiles Task Force Comments on AFCIN Concept
Papers on Soviet Missile Deployment

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REFERENCE: Cable to [REDACTED] 14 December 1960

1. Since these concept papers are considered internal AFCIN working papers, they have not been disseminated to the Guided Missiles Task Force on a formal basis although we are aware of the contents. Members of the GMAC Deployment Working Group have not discussed the themes set forth in these papers.

2. We have examined the concept papers with interest and have found them useful to stimulate thought on the overall problem of missile deployment. Although they review problems discussed for sometime, they have added several new analytical twists which we believe useful. Our approach has been to concentrate on developing the evidence so that firm patterns of deployment would result from our analytical effort. We have discussed, internally, several hypotheses which are similar to those in the concept papers and have found this research technique to be extremely useful.

3. Some of the installations mentioned in these papers have been suspect of a missile implication for several years. The most difficult aspect of the problem is to reduce the range of alternatives that can be hypothesized and to identify installations in the missile program (with their function) based on reasonable evidence. The geography of the Soviet Union does not permit an arbitrary choice of about 200 km spacing between support bases. We believe the evidence indicates a more concentrated development of the deployment pattern in the Baltic and Carpathian areas. This concentration could require more than one support area in these areas.

4. The use of a pattern approach requires the identification of a basic design and then the identification of repetitive patterns. Unfortunately, the patterns enumerated in the papers as examples of successful use of this

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technique (aircraft and SAM weapon system) are not the same type of problem as that contained in missile analysis. Missile bases, either launch sites or support facilities, do not necessarily have the same geographical relationship to fixed positions as, for example, SAM sites. The analogy does not appear to hold up.

5. However, the assumptions that relate missile facilities to airfields, existing rail or road support, large towns, existing military bases, are sound but do not really limit the suspect area within the USSR to any great degree. The papers emphasize the use of long-range Air Force bases for primary logistic support. We believe this thesis is too narrow. The tactical bases, which have undergone deactivation recently and have been assigned new transport units, have at least as great a potential for performing the basic support function as long-range Air Force bases.

6. Flight activity has been used successfully as an intelligence indicator and there has been relatively good success in the analysis when applied to the Soviet AB program. However, the success was predominately in the development and production aspects of the program. It is much more difficult, however, to determine the significance of flight activity for missile purposes when it becomes buried in the generality of military activity. This does not mean that this type of analysis is worthless. It is only more difficult and must be used with more caution.

7. The Tashkent area is considered to be no more probable for ICBM deployment than many other locations. There have been a number of pieces of evidence related to the Tashkent area which could be related to missile deployment. We have been investigating this evidence and hope to piece together a story. The construction site at Almalyk does not have the characteristics of a GM launch site. A river runs through the middle of the installation and appears to have been one of the basic criteria for the choice of the location for the unidentified construction activity.

8. The hypothesis that the Saratov area is an ICBM deployment area examined in this paper is sound. This area has been a major suspect area for some time. At present we do not believe there is sufficient evidence to establish a strong case or delineate the location of launch complexes.

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9. The [REDACTED] probably have as many associations with the missile program as any other [REDACTED] that we have examined. The exact function of most of these units has not been determined as yet. We are presently examining this problem in detail.

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